Foreign Currency Deposits and International Liquidity Shortages
      in Pakistan by Mirakhor, Abbas & Zaidi, Iqbal
The Pakistan Development Review 
45 : 1 (Spring 2006) pp. 49–85 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Currency Deposits and International  
Liquidity Shortages in Pakistan 
 
ABBAS MIRAKHOR and IQBAL ZAIDI* 
 
This paper studies the implications of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) for 
international liquidity shortages in Pakistan. The analysis focuses on how the large 
volume of FCDs and the specific institutional characteristics of those deposits have made 
the Pakistan economy highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks. The analysis shows that 
FCDs created another channel for government borrowing, and fiscal sustainability in a 
“closed” system may be very different from sustainability in a more “open” system. 
There is a need to think of these issues in terms of total balance sheet vulnerability, and 
we recommend measures that would make domestic currency-denominated assets 
attractive to investors.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on several shortcomings in the way in which the capital 
account of the balance of payments in Pakistan was liberalised with the introduction 
of foreign currency deposits (FCD). The policymakers thought that the foreign 
currency deposits might be the answer to the low level of savings and investment in 
the economy, because these deposits could help to mobilise both domestic and 
external savings. However, the increase in potential savings from the FCDs did not 
result in a boom in investment, but instead these short-term foreign liabilities helped 
to finance large fiscal and external current account deficits for a somewhat longer 
period than would have been possible otherwise. The end result was that the country 
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was saddled with a debt overhang problem, which severely constrained long-term 
growth prospects. The experience of Pakistan demonstrates the importance of public 
debt sustainability for maintaining economic stability and growth, and underlines the 
difficulties that borrowing governments face in assessing what are appropriate debt 
levels, that is, those that can be sustained, especially if there is a high degree of 
dollarisation in the economy. The analysis attempts to pinpoint the central structural 
weaknesses in the financial system, focusing in particular on how short-term foreign 
liabilities have adversely affected the conduct of financial policies.1  
The FCD scheme required banks to sell all of the foreign exchange deposited 
with them to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), which in turn provided foreign 
exchange cover to the commercial banks. The SBP provided the forward cover at 
subsidised rates for almost all years during the operation of the original scheme,2 and 
the foreign exchange earnings that could have gone into international reserve 
accumulation were instead used for financing persistent fiscal and external 
imbalances.3  The resulting open foreign exchange position  became an increasingly 
difficult problem for the SBP with the continued growth of the FCDs, on the one 
hand, and the rundown of international reserves, on the other hand. The problem was 
made worse by the failure of the private sector to adequately insure against the 
possibility of an international liquidity shortage (defined to be one where the external 
 
1Our focus on FCDs is not meant to “put too much blame” on them as a cause of Pakistan’s 
problems, instead by limiting our analysis to a few key factors, we hope to provide a more in-depth 
analysis of certain core issues that are frequently mentioned in policy discussions, but that could benefit 
from a more rigorous treatment. Needless to say, this paper does not aim to cover all of the difficulties 
(e.g., terms of trade deterioration, sharp fluctuations in capital inflows, droughts in some years, floods in 
some others, and political instability) that stymied the several attempts made by the authorities at 
introducing comprehensive stabilisation and structural reform programs. Excellent and detailed accounts 
of what happened more broadly and what needs to be done in Pakistan can be found elsewhere. See, for 
example, IMF (2001, 2002a, 2002b), IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2002), and World Bank (2002). 
See also the important contribution of Yaqub (2003), which not only provides an authoritative analysis of 
monetary policy and banking sector reforms but also sheds light on the complex political environment in 
Pakistan. 
2The description of the FCD scheme in this paragraph is for (what might be termed for the lack of 
a better word) the “original” FCD scheme, which was in effect till May 1998, at which time the authorities 
imposed a freeze on the convertibility of foreign currency deposits. Subsequently, a new set of regulations 
were issued for FCDs, and these are sometimes called the “new” FCD deposits, and while these deposits 
have grown rapidly, some of the problems such as the SBP providing forward cover are not present in the 
new scheme. In several instances we try to point out this crucial difference between the two regimes, but it 
should be kept in mind that most of the discussion in this paper deals with the problems from the original 
scheme, although many of the same issues crop up with the new regime, including the need for self-
protection policies to reduce the country’s exposure to capital account crises. 
3This policy dilemma was a result of the fiscal pressures on monetary policy and the balance of 
payments, on the one hand, and the way the FCD scheme was operated, on the other hand. Furthermore, 
since the SBP was incurring quasi-fiscal deficits, both on account of providing forward cover at subsidised 
rates to encourage deposit mobilisation and also in implementing various concessional lending schemes, 
the fiscal problems were compounded by the build-up of FCDs and the ensuing losses on the central 
bank’s balance sheet. See Yaqub (2003).   
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supply of funds is a vertical curve). This issue is discussed below in considerable 
detail in terms of the Caballero-Krishnamurthy dual liquidity model, where the 
private sector underinsures against crisis events, and the extent of the underinsurance 
depends on the expectations about central bank actions during a crisis. 
Unfortunately, instead of taking either direct or indirect ex-ante measures that would 
have encouraged the private sector to carry more international liquidity into the crisis 
situation, the authorities were doing exactly the opposite, namely, encouraging the 
build-up of FCDs through preferential treatment (taxes, SBP provision of forward 
cover at subsidised rates, etc.). In particular, despite the private sector 
underinsurance problem and the high risks of international liquidity shortages, the 
authorities left the international reserves at low levels; in fact, for many years they 
rarely met even the rough rules of thumb for adequate reserve/import cover. By the 
mid-1990s, the authorities were facing not only a public sector debt that was 
reaching unsustainable proportions but also a nagging problem of inadequate 
international liquidity.  
The paper is organised along the following lines. Following this section, 
Section II discusses the effects of persistent fiscal deficits in Pakistan on domestic 
savings and external indebtedness. The discussion focuses on how the FCD scheme 
helped to mobilise savings but only at the cost of putting severe strains on financial 
policies, which leads to the discussion of capital account liberalisation and FCDs. 
Section III begins with a description of the evolution of the FCD scheme, then 
discusses the implications of the FCDs and dollarisation for the conduct of financial 
policies, and concludes by weighing the benefits from having large foreign currency 
deposits against their costs. This discussion of capital account liberalisation, 
financial market distortions, and excessive volatility in asset prices during the 
various episodes of near financial crises sets the stage for the prescriptions for 
optimal policy responses to these crises, which are taken up in the following section. 
Section IV describes the government’s policy response to the various episodes of 
financial distress, focusing not only on the steps that have been taken but also on 
what additional steps must be taken. Finally, Section V contains some brief 
concluding remarks, including a comment on the priorities for fiscal consolidation 
and the reform of the FCD scheme. The analytics of the Caballero-Krishnamurthy 
model and its implications for the FCD scheme in Pakistan are provided in the 
Appendix.   
 
II. FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS, FISCAL DEFICITS,  
AND EXTERNAL DEBT 
Pakistan experienced protracted balance of payments problems throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, reflecting the expansionary financial policies but also weaknesses 
in the structure of the external sector (Table 1). The country had a narrow            
base of export products;  over  half of the exports were from cotton and  cotton-based  
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Table 1 
Basic Economic Indicators, 1973–2003 
Year 
GNI growth 
(Percent) 
Inflation 
(End-of 
Period) 
Current 
Account 
Deficit 
(Percent of 
GDP) 
International 
Reserves 
(Months of 
Imports of 
G&S) 
REER 
(Percentage 
Change) 
Official 
Exchange 
Rate 
(Rupees per 
Dollar) 
1973 24.33 23.07 –1.40 5.93 n.a. 9.88 
1974 29.90 26.66 –10.04 3.60 n.a. 9.88 
1975 28.42 20.90 –9.18 2.09 n.a. 9.88 
1976 18.72 7.16 –6.33 2.65 n.a. 9.88 
1977 16.40 10.13 –4.12 2.30 n.a. 9.88 
1978 21.42 6.14 –4.53 1.77 n.a. 9.88 
1979 11.13 8.27 –4.28 0.83 n.a. 9.88 
1980 20.54 11.94 –3.25 1.26 n.a. 9.88 
1981 19.18 11.88 –2.86 1.52 12.46 9.88 
1982 16.16 5.90 –1.27 2.34 –8.39 12.84 
1983 15.53 6.36 –1.84 4.03 –3.42 13.50 
1984 13.77 6.09 –3.57 2.20 2.12 15.36 
1985 11.12 5.61 –2.66 1.58 –6.60 15.98 
1986 8.90 3.51 –1.73 1.58 –17.48 17.25 
1987 9.53 4.68 –2.60 1.15 –11.02 17.45 
1988 15.71 8.84 –3.45 0.83 –1.50 18.65 
1989 13.10 7.84 –3.59 1.00 –6.39 21.42 
1990 11.78 9.05 –3.54 0.60 –6.54 21.90 
1991 16.83 11.79 –3.33 0.98 –1.82 24.72 
1992 17.02 9.51 –4.30 1.18 –1.43 25.70 
1993 10.27 9.97 –4.81 1.56 –0.35 30.12 
1994 16.55 12.37 –3.61 3.77 –2.24 30.80 
1995 20.12 12.34 –5.54 2.09 –0.65 34.25 
1996 12.39 10.37 –6.44 0.69 –1.96 40.12 
1997 14.01 11.38 –4.22 1.35 3.08 44.05 
1998 10.14 6.23 –3.19 1.33 –3.47 45.89 
1999 9.78 4.14 –2.79 2.01 –5.72 51.78 
2000 7.53 4.37 –1.89 1.71 1.18 58.03 
2001 7.67 3.15 0.42 4.12 –6.95 60.86 
2002 8.55 3.29 4.14 8.31 3.95 58.53 
2003 14.70 2.91 3.27 9.27 –4.94 57.22 
Period Averages       
1973–79 21.47 14.62 –5.70 2.74 n.a. 9.88 
1980–89 14.35 7.27 –2.68 1.75 –4.47 15.22 
1990–99 13.89 9.72 –4.18 1.56 –2.11 34.93 
2000–03 9.61 3.43 1.49 5.85 –1.69 58.66 
Sources: World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics Databases.  
International Liquidity Shortages 53 
products. Workers remittances were a sizable proportion of total exports, 
although they declined in the 1990s and became a somewhat less important 
source of foreign exchange earnings, but this trend has again reversed in recent 
years. The sharp fluctuations in these remittances reflected changes in economic, 
political, and other conditions in the host countries, as well as in Pakistan. The 
persistent current account deficits had been financed, inter alia, by foreign direct 
investment and portfolio capital, but more so by the accumulation of short-term 
foreign liabilities on account of the FCDs and foreign assistance by bilateral and 
multilateral donors (Tables 2 and 3).  
 
Table 2 
Foreign Currency Deposits and Official Reserves, 1990-91–2003-04 
Fiscal Year1/ NRFCD2/ RFCD3/ 
TFCD4/ 
(a) 
International 
Reserves5/ 
(b) 
Difference 
(b-a) 
1990-1991 2,203 389 2,592 1,390 –1,202 
1991-1992 1,989 1,707 3,696 1,761 –1,935 
1992-1993 2,227 2,250 4,478 1,369 –3,109 
1993-1994 2,920 3,002 5,923 3,337 –2,586 
1994-1995 3,191 3,384 6,575 3,730 –2,845 
1995-1996 4,158 4,147 8,305 3,251 –5,054 
1996-1997 4,352 5,491 9,843 1,977 –7,866 
1997-1998 3,655 6,024 9,679 1,736 –7,943 
1998-1999 2,493 2,354 4,848 2,371 –2,477 
1999-2000 1,641 1,303 2,944 2,150 –794 
2000-2001 1,184 1,069 2,253 2,666 413 
2001-2002 424 770 1,194 5,439 4,245 
2002-2003 62 232 293 10,700 10,407 
2003-2004 46 175 221 12,114 11,893 
Period Averages      
1990-91–1999-00 2,883 3,005 5,888 2,307 –3,581 
2000-01–2002-03 557 690 1,247 6,268 5,022 
Source: Pakistani authorities.  
1/Fiscal year ends on June 30. Observation for 2003-04 represents the data of February 2004.  
2/Non-resident foreign currency deposit.  
3/Resident foreign deposit.  
4/Total foreign currency deposit.  
5/International reserves include gold, SDR, foreign exchange reserves, and authorised dealers’ 
balances.  
Mirakhor and Zaidi 54 
Table 3 
Resident Foreign Currency Deposits (RFCD) and  
Money Supply, 1990-91–2003-04 
Fiscal Year 1/ 
M2  
(In Millions of 
Rupees) 
RFCDs  
(In Millions of 
Rupees) 
Ratio of RFCD  
to M2  
(In Percent) 
1990-91 368,783 9,957 2.70 
1991-92 480,644 44,382 9.23 
1992-93 567,169 65,712 11.59 
1993-94 662,805 96,138 14.50 
1994-95 772,998 108,654 14.06 
1995-96 938,680 145,958 15.55 
1996-97 1,053,234 222,882 21.16 
1997-98 1,206,320 278,556 23.09 
1998-99 1,280,546 120,917 9.44 
1999-00 1,400,632 112,475 8.03 
2000-01 1,526,044 154,154 10.10 
2001-02 1,761,370 157,456 8.94 
2002-03 2,078,769 126,138 6.07 
2003-04 2/ 2,312,307 148,282 6.41 
Period Averages    
1990-91–1999-00 873,181 120,563 12.94 
2000-01–2002-03 1,788,728 145,916 8.37 
Source: Pakistani authorities.  
1/Fiscal year ends on June 30.  
2/Latest available data.  
 
Under the regulations governing the FCD scheme, the commercial banks were 
not allowed to use the foreign exchange they received from the FCDs for holding 
foreign exchange assets, but instead had to surrender it to the State Bank, which 
provided them with rupees at the prevailing exchange rate. The commercial banks 
would use the rupees for lending to the private and public sectors, as well as meeting 
reserve and liquidity requirements. At the same time, the commercial banks closed 
their open forex position by purchasing forward cover from the State Bank, which 
was sold at subsidised rates (the rate of depreciation of the rupee exceeded the cost 
of forward cover) for almost all years during the operation of the original scheme. 
Thus, the FCDs were a highly profitable proposition for the commercial banks, and 
they were more interested in mobilising FCDs than deposits denominated in rupees. 
The forward cover contract would be for six months, and so long as the deposits 
remained with them, the commercial banks would purchase a new contract upon 
expiry of the old one (see below).  
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Besides the opening up of the capital account and its implications for private 
sector behaviour, the FCD scheme had another major implication for macroeconomic 
stability, because it significantly expanded the capacity of the authorities to obtain 
reserves through external borrowing.4  For one thing, the opening up of the capital 
account made international liquidity a much broader and more relevant concept than 
international reserves. Instead of relying solely on official international reserve assets 
for the financing of balance of payments deficits, the authorities could use other 
available resources such as borrowing those assets from private domestic residents 
that were close substitutes for international reserves or borrowing from private 
international capital markets. As noted above, the FCD scheme required that all of 
the foreign exchange earnings deposited with the commercial banks be sold to the 
central bank, which in turn provided foreign exchange cover to the commercial 
banks. These structural changes to the international liquidity system had made it 
difficult to derive either simple rules of thumb or rigorous quantitative projections 
that could serve as meaningful criteria for assessing the need for reserve 
accumulation.5 Accordingly, the discussion below on the need for reserve 
accumulation, particularly given the large foreign exchange borrowings, will shy 
away from constructing quantitative measures of international liquidity or in 
comparing reserve holdings with the levels of imports. Instead, greater consideration 
will be given to an analysis of whether larger stocks of owned reserves would have 
improved the performance of the economy.  
More generally, external borrowing permits a country to maintain domestic 
investment at levels beyond those that could be financed through domestic saving 
alone. If these resources have been channeled into productive capital accumulation, 
these investments could be expected to generate the stream of returns required to 
repay the original loans. If the resources were used to sustain consumption, the 
repayment of the indebtedness must be at the expense of future levels of 
consumption, a far more onerous prospect. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to 
know whether the increased indebtedness of Pakistan reflected increased investment 
or increased consumption. The worsening of the current deficit of the public sector in 
 
4Bartolini and Drazen (1997). 
5One could argue that the FCDs did not necessarily make it more difficult to derive rules for 
prudent reserve accumulation, because given the set-up in which the SBP provided forward cover to the 
commercial banks, one could simply add FCDs to external short-term liabilities and calculate the optimal 
reserve levels from this metric. However, if one were to use this metric, then it would show that the 
Pakistan authorities had considered optimal reserve levels for many years in the period under review to be 
negative several months of imports of goods and services, which seems highly unlikely. In fact, the 
authorities had seen the FCDs not as short-term liabilities, but as a permanent fixture of the financial 
system, not least because they expected automatic roll-over of the deposits, particularly those held by the 
overseas workers. Needless to say, the authorities faced many constraints in hitting the reserve targets but 
those would not have caused such large deviations from optimal levels (e.g., from say three months of 
imports to negative several months of imports). 
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the mid-1980s was associated with low levels of total investment in the economy.6 
Since the increase in indebtedness reflected an increase in consumption spending 
rather than an increase in investment outlays, it is not surprising that Pakistan ran 
into severe debt-servicing problems and had to seek debt rescheduling.  
The external debt situation reached a crisis point in the aftermath of the 
nuclear tests in 1998, and the imposition of economic sanctions and the suspension 
of economic assistance by the G-8 countries (Table 4).7  As the balance of payments 
outlook deteriorated sharply and the country faced a large external financing gap, the 
ESAF/EFF arrangement with the IMF went off track. In the absence of a program 
supported by IMF resources, the government decided to “suspend repayment of 
bilateral debt......with the continuity of payments to the international financial 
institutions, it was possible to initiate negotiations with the IMF, which led to the 
revival of ESAF/EFF arrangement...This was followed by debt relief by the Paris 
Club and regularisation of bilateral and commercial debt payment arrears”.8 The 
external debt owed to official creditors was restructured to achieve medium-term 
debt sustainability, and the approach adopted with regard to the external debt owed 
to private sector debt was to maintain the face value of the claims and reduce the 
coupon/interest rate at below market rates.   
One way to describe the fiscal and balance of payments problems of Pakistan, 
and the role played by the FCDs in exacerbating those problems, would be to say 
that what had started off as a “first-generation” balance of payments crisis model, 
that is, fiscal and current account imbalances, was transformed into what would be 
termed the “third generation” model of financial crises, reflecting fragilities in the 
balance sheets of the government, the central bank, and commercial banks.9  In the 
first generation model, currency crisis is seen in macroeconomic terms, with the 
main mechanism being the monetisation of unsustainable budget deficits leading to 
reserve losses and the abandonment of an exchange rate peg.10  We have discussed 
the budget deficits and balance of payments problems in the context of the Pakistan 
economy in Mirakhor and Zaidi (2004), including an extensive discussion of how the 
economy came under strain from weaknesses in taxation and public sector 
expenditures,  as  well as  the impact of the government’s debt burden.  Although the  
 
6See Hook (1997). 
7The dollarisation of liabilities in the banking system should be seen in relation to Pakistan’s 
external debt, which was not denominated in the domestic currency. If the external debt had been 
denominated in rupees, it would have had the important advantage that the debt would have been 
effectively contingent on aggregate outcomes for the economy. However, since the debt was denominated 
in foreign currency, the country did not have the insurance that could have been obtained from foreigner’s 
against events that depreciated the rupee, including when there was a tightening of the external financial 
constraint. 
8Yaqub (2003), p. 100. 
9See Chang and Velasco (2000), Flood and Marion (2001, 2002), and Krugman (1999). 
10See Krugman (1979), and Flood and Garber (1984).  
Table 4 
External Debt, 1991/92–2003/04 1/ 
Period Averages 
 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Projected 
2003-04 
1991-92– 
1999-00 
2000-01 – 
2003-04 
 (In Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Total 22,880 25,913 28,990 31,330 32,709 33,908 33,545 34,046 35,321 35,332 35,609 35,123 35,452 30,960 35,379 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed 2/ 22,507 24,479 26,098 28,108 28,121 28,709 29,000 29,318 31,031 31,935 32,769 32,608 33,689 27,486 32,750 
Private 373 1,434 2,892 3,222 4,588 5,199 4,545 4,728 4,290 3,396 2,840 2,515 1,763 3,474 2,629 
 (In Percent of GDP) 
Total 46.8 50.1 55.6 51.4 51.4 54.1 53.7 58.1 58.0 60.1 60.1 51.0 45.7 53.2 54.2 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed 2/ 46.1 47.3 50.1 46.1 44.2 45.8 46.4 50.0 50.9 54.3 55.3 47.4 43.4 47.4 50.1 
Private 0.8 2.8 5.5 5.3 7.2 8.3 7.3 8.1 7.0 5.8 4.8 3.7 2.3 5.8 4.1 
Foreign Currency 
Deposits 3/ 4.1 4.3 5.6 5.2 6.5 6.9 5.8 4.3 2.7 2.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 5.1 0.7 
Other 4/ 2.7 2.5 2.8 3.3 2.2 4.1 4.6 6.0 5.5 5.1 6.0 2.1 2.6 3.7 3.9 
 (In Percent of Current Foreign Exchange Receipts) 
Total 202.2 240.9 268.0 256.7 260.1 262.4 251.0 310.2 301.4 273.9 250.6 178.7 171.4 261.4 218.6 
Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed 2/ 198.9 227.5 241.2 230.3 223.6 222.1 217.0 267.2 264.8 247.6 230.6 165.9 162.8 232.5 201.7 
Private 3.3 13.3 26.7 26.4 36.5 40.2 34.0 43.1 36.6 26.3 20.0 12.8 8.5 28.9 16.9 
Foreign Currency 
Deposits 17.6 20.7 27.0 26.1 33.1 33.7 27.3 22.7 14.0 9.2 3.0 0.3 0.2 24.7 3.2 
Other 4/ 11.8 12.0 13.6 16.7 10.9 19.8 21.4 32.0 28.6 23.2 24.8 7.2 9.7 18.5 16.2 
 (In Percent of Private External Debt) 
Foreign Currency 
Deposits 533.3 155.3 101.0 99.0 90.6 83.7 80.4 52.7 38.3 34.9 14.9 2.5 2.6 137.2 13.7 
Other 4/ 356.9 90.0 50.7 63.1 29.9 49.2 62.9 74.3 78.2 88.1 124.3 56.3 114.0 95.1 95.7 
Sources: State Bank of Pakistan; Ministry of Finance; and Federal Bureau of Statistics.  
1/ External debt after rescheduling /restructuring as of June 30 in each year.  
2/ Including central bank.  
3/ Nonresident foreign currency deposits.  
4/ Short-term debt; includes commercial bank and IDB borrowing, Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificates (FEBC), Dollar Bearer Certificates (DBC), and State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) liabilities (including swaps).  
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two main issues confronting the authorities, namely the persistence of widespread 
poverty and the high level of debt, continue to generate conflicting pressures on the 
fiscal stance, we are not going to press the point here, since we have argued for it 
elsewhere. Suffice it to say that while prospects for achieving debt sustainability 
have improved, Pakistan remains a highly indebted country.11  Furthermore, since 
poverty is still widespread, the envisaged shift in public expenditure towards 
increased social and development spending must be implemented expeditiously, but 
even with the improved policies, considerable challenges remain in the reduction of 
poverty and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.  
The “second generation” models take a different tack insofar as a currency 
crisis is explained as an endogenous policy decision by the authorities to devalue or 
not on the basis of their objective function, which balances the benefits and costs of 
exchange rate realignment.12  The second generation models emphasise that it is not 
just fundamental weaknesses but also self-fulfilling expectations or sunspot 
equilibria that are behind many financial crises. In Pakistan, the substantial short-
term dollar liabilities in the banking system and the provision of forward cover by 
the central bank for those liabilities, but without the international reserves to back 
them up, meant that there were chronic risks of self-fulfilling rollover crises driven 
by depositors who might loose confidence and decide to withdraw their funds. 
Whereas these features could be discussed in terms of the second generation models, 
it is perhaps more illuminating to discuss them in the context of the balance sheet 
approach as a product of liquidity and currency mismatches, or what have been 
called the third generation models.   
The third generation models have the advantage of not only providing policy 
recommendations for the public sector based on an analysis of its balance sheet, but 
also in helping to pinpoint a number of additional vulnerabilities in the corporate and 
financial sectors. In particular, since financial markets adjust much faster than non-
financial markets, the onset of a capital account-driven crisis is swifter and deeper 
than a current account-driven crisis. Thus, an external current account balance might 
adjust over several quarters or even years, but an open capital account can adjust in a 
matter of days. To the extent that the FCD scheme had led to de facto capital account 
convertibility even before current account convertibility could be achieved, there was 
the problem that the rapid adjustments in the capital account would result in 
overshooting in the exchange markets, which would in turn magnify the impact that 
financial developments had on the real economy.13  There were many episodes in 
which non-resident capital inflows would slow down sharply or stop altogether, and 
 
11We note Pakistan’s success in returning to the international capital market through the issuance 
of a US$500 million five-year sovereign bond in 2004, which was considerably over-subscribed, and had 
a broad-based market presence, including European and Far Eastern investors. 
12See Obstfeld (1994, 1996). 
13See Yaqub (2003). 
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residents would exacerbate the “sudden stop” problem by switching from holding 
domestic assets (such as deposits in local banks) to foreign assets (deposits in banks 
located abroad).  
In the presence of large government borrowing needs, the SBP frequently had 
no option but to inject liquidity, which mostly resulted in inflation or was sterilised 
by losses of international reserves.14 There were also a few episodes in which the 
SBP tried to control the excess liquidity by resorting to open market operations and 
increases in interest rates. In addition, in the face of sustained foreign exchange 
market pressures and the desire to preserve the level of international reserves, the 
SBP had allowed the rupee to depreciate gradually most of the times. However, as 
discussed extensively in the context of the Caballero-Krishnamurthy model below, 
there were occasions when there was resistance to exchange rate flexibility. As a 
result, the exchange market pressures would build up, and the SBP would eventually 
resort to discrete exchange rate adjustments. The exchange rate depreciation 
worsened the public finances owing to the higher domestic cost of debt service, and 
as discussed extensively elsewhere in the paper, the SBP’s balance sheet was 
adversely affected by the depreciation, because it provided foreign exchange cover to 
the commercial banks.  
Given the provision of forward cover by the SBP, the commercial banks did 
not have an open foreign exchange position, but they did have to face the problem of 
their borrower’s solvency following a depreciation. The Pakistan experience with 
regard to the balance sheets of banks was different from those in the Asian financial 
crisis in which private corporations, especially in Indonesia and Thailand, found 
themselves suddenly insolvent. In those Asian countries, even though many bank 
loans were hedged on paper, the corporate defaults on domestic dollar-denominated 
loans left the banks unable to cover their dollar deposits. Ultimately, external 
overborrowing and currency risk shifted from the corporate sector to banks (which 
faced loan defaults) and then to the government (sharing in the recapitalisation of 
 
14The sharp increase in capital inflows following the introduction of the FCD scheme was initially 
seen as a welcome development, and although there were some concerns regarding possible adverse 
effects on inflationary pressures and exchange rate overvaluation, these concerns were largely set aside as 
the FCDs were not seen as imposing a serious constraint on the conduct of financial policies. However, 
the large buildup of FCDs based on workers’ remittances and other inflows was not an “endogenous effect 
or a pull” of resources into Pakistan to satisfy a large unmet demand for investment financing. The inflow 
was more of an “exogenous event or a push” that resulted from the sharp increase in Pakistani workers in 
the gulf and other oil exporting countries in the Middle East in the wake of the oil boom. This point is 
worth elaborating in terms of asking the hypothetical question of what happens to investment when there 
are restrictions on capital inflows. There are two polor scenarios: (1) when physical investment is 
constrained by the availability of domestic saving, then a relaxation of the capital account restrictions 
would allow higher domestic investment. (2) If domestic investment is not constrained by saving, or 
alternatively and this was the case in Pakistan, if the foreign savings are pre-empted and used for public 
sector consumption, then integration with the international capital markets would not lead to higher levels 
of domestic investment. The question that did the increase in foreign capital served to finance investment 
or was it really financing consumption is discussed in Mirakhor and Zaidi (2004). 
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now-insolvent banks). In Pakistan, the currency risk was borne by the central bank, 
but there was still the problem of corporate defaults insofar as a large currency 
depreciation sometimes led to increases in borrowing costs and/or credit rationing, 
which would hurt the performance of the firms much more than any gains from 
increases in the own product price. For public enterprises, whose output prices were 
rigid, the costs rose following the depreciation but the revenues did not rise 
concomitantly. This explains why there was resistance to exchange rate depreciation 
among various groups, even when the depreciation was simply to preserve the real 
exchange rate in the face of inflation. The reason for mentioning this point is not to 
deny the efficacy of the exchange rate as a tool for macroeconomic adjustment, but 
rather to point out the complexities involved and the constraints imposed by the FCD 
scheme on the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies in Pakistan.  
Moreover, even for private enterprises, whose output prices were flexible and 
borrowing was mostly in domestic currency, there was still resistance to a more 
active exchange rate policy because of the reliance on short-term borrowing and the 
need for periodic refinancing by the firms. This problem may be attributed at least in 
part to the FCD scheme, because even when there was access to international capital 
markets, there was the need for periodic refinancing of the borrowing undertaken by 
the authorities to finance international reserve holdings, and the costs of such 
financing had exhibited marked volatility. Since the authorities had kept reserve 
holdings to unduly low levels because of cost considerations, the result was that the 
country had become vulnerable to shocks that adversely affected the balance of 
payments positions. The authorities could have held down the risk premium the 
country had to pay on its external borrowing by pursuing appropriate 
macroeconomic policies and strengthening the external current account position. 
This would have led to an increase in the proportion of owned reserves, which would 
have reduced the country’s vulnerability to abrupt changes in the availability of 
borrowed reserves. Unfortunately, since the authorities could not always rely upon 
private markets to extend borrowed reserves, the high and volatile risk premium 
and/or credit rationing in external borrowing had a severe adverse effect on the 
domestic financial market. These external disturbances would be translated into high 
and variable domestic borrowing costs, and some firms would face credit rationing, 
even though they had to refinance their short-term loans.  
 
III. FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON 
FINANCIAL POLICIES  
 
(a) FCD Scheme and International Reserves  
The way in which the FCD scheme was implemented (see Box 1 for a brief 
discussion of the evolution and technical details of the FCD scheme) meant that it 
was a major step in the liberalisation of the capital account. It not only liberalised the 
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capital account insofar as it allowed nonresidents (e.g., Pakistani’s residing abroad) 
to make deposits in the domestic banking system and then use these deposits freely 
for various kinds of capital account transactions, which were previously restricted, 
but it also meant an opening up of the capital account even for the residents who had 
FCD deposits. It might appear puzzling as to how the transactions between two 
residents (resident depositors and domestic banks) can translate into a capital account 
issue, but it can be explained in terms of the highly restrictive exchange and 
payments regime before the introduction of the resident FCD scheme. Foreign 
exchange was almost a forbidden word in the years before the FCDs, as exchange 
controls loomed large in the minds of anyone; even one who needed foreign 
exchange for a private visit abroad for medical treatment or educational purposes had 
to face several bureaucratic and other hurdles. However, as the FCDs grew rapidly, 
the government deregulated the stringent foreign exchange regime, and this was a 
great benefit for both the bankers and the public at large; resident Pakistanis were 
allowed to open and maintain foreign currency accounts, and they could use those 
funds for most international trade and financial dealings, current account as well as 
capital account transactions.  
Some of the biggest beneficiaries of the FCD scheme and the foreign 
exchange deregulations were residents who could now deposit in the domestic 
banking system their savings and have a hedge against any depreciation of the 
rupee. At the same time, these accounts also greatly facilitated the making of direct 
payments outside of the country, thereby avoiding the cumbersome procedures 
involved in documenting and obtaining permission for external remittances in the 
previous foreign exchange regime (international travelers, students in overseas 
colleges and medical patients going for treatment abroad were prime 
beneficiaries). Moreover, in contrast to the previous stringent exchange controls, 
residents could buy foreign exchange from authorised dealers or even from the 
kerb market, and then deposit the funds into FCD accounts, and in sharp contrast 
to the previous exchange and control regime, use those accounts for capital 
account transactions.  
The FCD scheme had not only led to the premature liberalisation of the capital 
account and the dollarisation of the economy, it had also led to the segmentation of 
the foreign exchange market, mainly in terms of diverting home remittances from the 
official to the moneychangers market. The FCD scheme also created several well-
connected special interest groups who profited from the multiple exchange rate 
regime and opposed the various proposals for exchange reforms.15 Besides the 
provision of forward cover by the SBP at subsidised  rates,  the FCDs were exempted  
 
15For example, residents could use the dollars from the FCDs to buy Foreign Exchange Bearer 
Certificates (FEBC) that were traded on the stock market, and since the implicit exchange rates on these 
instruments would frequently diverge from the official rates, this would result in multiple currency 
practices. 
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Box 1. Evolution of FCDs 
A notable characteristic of Pakistan’s financial system during the period since the mid-1970s has been the large 
increase in Foreign Currency Deposits (FCD) in the banking system. Foreign currency accounts were introduced in 1973 
with a view to providing a savings instrument in the domestic banking system that would be attractive for the sizable and 
growing population of Pakistanis working abroad, but there was also the motivation mentioned earlier to increase the 
foreign saving available to finance government deficits. Initially, these deposits were transfers from abroad, mainly 
workers remittances, but the FCD scheme proved to be perhaps even more attractive than had been originally intended, 
and these deposits grew rapidly. In particular, when residents were allowed to hold FCDs in 1991, the scheme acquired a 
new dimension in terms of a major opening up of the capital account of the balance of payments. These liberalisation 
measures led to increasing dollarisation, because the high and variable rates of inflation and exchange rate depreciation, 
together with the limited flexibility in rates of return on bank deposits denominated in rupees, made foreign-currency- 
denominated assets more attractive as stores of value. Residents were finding that the returns on foreign currency 
denominated deposits, after adjusting for the exchange rate depreciation, were often higher than those available on rupee 
assets, not least because the relative attractiveness of FCDs was exaggerated by tax advantages plus better terms given by 
banks because of the forward cover provided by the SBP. Furthermore, the foreign-currency-denominated assets were 
perceived to be less risky because of lower fluctuations in the real rates of return and also in terms of possible changes in 
the taxes on financial assets; taxes on rupee assets had been changed on a few occasions, whereas foreign currency 
deposits had remained tax free since their inception.  
Whether one looks at absolute figures for FCDs, or per annum growth rates, or any other commonly used 
measure for the performance and attractiveness of an asset, it is clear that FCDs grew very rapidly. Foreign currency 
deposits grew from US$26 million in 1975/76 (the first full year of their operation) to a peak of US$10 billion in 1998 
(excluding institutional deposits). The per annum growth rates were almost always in the double digit levels and on 
occasions in the high double digit levels such as in 1985/86 when the growth was 83 percent or 1991/92 when it was 43 
percent. While these growth rates and absolute figures are large, they are even more striking when they are expressed as a 
proportion of foreign exchange reserves and trade flows. FCDs represented 558 percent of foreign exchange reserves in 
1997/1998. As a proportion of imports, FCDs amounted to 94 percent in 1997/98. In addition, the dollarisation ratio—the 
ratio of resident foreign currency deposits to broad money inclusive of foreign currency deposits—had risen sharply to 
reach 23 percent in 1997/98.16  
From the inception of foreign currency deposits in Pakistan in January 1973 till June 1992, the State Bank had 
provided forward cover to the financial institutions without charging any fee for the service. However, as the foreign 
currency deposits increased rapidly and the rupee depreciated against the major currencies during the second half of the 
1980s, the losses incurred by the State Bank from its forward cover operations increased substantially. To offset those 
losses, it was decided to introduce a forward cover fee effective from July 1, 1992. Initially, the forward cover fee was set 
at the rate of 3 percent per annum on U.S. dollar deposits, but there were only a few minor upward revisions to that fee, 
which were not enough to cover the cost.1718 A major constraint was that since sharp changes in the forward cover 
premium fee could possibly lead to large movements in FCDs, particularly the institutional funds mobilised by the banks. 
Accordingly, the forward cover fee was almost never adjusted when there would be changes in expectations of rupee 
depreciation, with the only exception being the minor changes in the second-half of the 1990s.  
The provision of forward cover by the State Bank to the commercial banks on their FCDs had tended to lower central 
bank’s profits, because the charges on the provision of forward cover had been less than the losses from rupee 
depreciation, except for 1994/95 when there was a small net profit. For example, in 1993/94 and 1995/96, the net losses 
from forward cover operations were in excess of Rs. 13 billion, which meant lower SBP profits and nontax revenues. The 
root cause for these losses was that there was a quasi-fiscal motive behind the provision of forward cover for FCDs. 
 
16It should be noted that the estimates of dollarisation in the Pakistan economy that are discussed 
are biased downward. Since data on foreign exchange deposited abroad and foreign cash held by residents 
are not available, the estimates of dollarisation are based on domestic foreign currency deposits only, 
which greatly underestimate the dollarisation phenomenon. For one thing, the currency-to-deposit ratio in 
Pakistan is very high in comparison to other countries, which can be explained in terms of the high 
inflation rate but also the high transactions costs in the banking system, notably the delays in the provision 
of banking services, as well as a general lack of confidence in the banks given the well-known high 
administrative costs and large nonperforming assets of the major banks. For the same reasons, one would 
expect that there are significant holdings of foreign cash in the country, and the data reported in this paper 
should be interpreted as providing a lower bound for estimates of dollarisation. 
17In setting the forward cover fee, the State Bank would target a profit margin for banks on 
foreign currency deposits of about 2 percent, taking into account likely developments in domestic lending 
rates and international deposit rates. Since domestic and international interest rates often exhibited sharp 
fluctuations over relatively short periods, there were periods when the calculated profit margins differed 
significantly from the 2 percent target. 
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from taxation, and depositors were protected from official inquiries about the sources 
of income for their deposits, which was of “value” to at least some depositors 
because of the problems with tax evasion in the country. In addition, FCDs were a 
highly liquid savings instrument because of the unrestricted withdrawal facilities, 
which greatly facilitated international transactions in both the current and capital 
accounts. As stressed in Yaqub (2003), the removal of many of the features of the 
FCD scheme, which were behind the market distortions, if not the dismantling of the 
scheme itself, was vital for the reform of the exchange market, but the dependence of 
the country on the scheme to finance persistent current account deficits had greatly 
complicated that task. “The benefit of the scheme to the government was that it had 
access to foreign exchange that could otherwise be tucked away in accounts in 
foreign countries or under the rug within the country. The successive governments 
found it a convenient source of financing the rising current account deficit, and 
thereby postponing difficult policy measures to address the fundamental 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments”.18 
The provision of forward cover for FCD deposits at subsidised rates by the 
SBP, and indeed the way in which the rates of return on these deposits were 
calculated by the commercial banks, were in many respects inconsistent with the 
official policy of Islamic banking, which was introduced in 1985. The key 
requirement of Islamic banking is the replacement of interest-based financial 
instruments with others that operate on the basis of risk and profit sharing.19  Iqbal 
and Mirakhor (1987) discuss how the Islamisation process in Pakistan was 
undertaken in phases: the asset side of the banking system apparently has been much 
slower than the liability side in converting to Islamic modes of finance. The FCDs 
did not have any close linkages with the real rates of return in the economy at large, 
nor with the profitability of the individual banks. The depositors in the FCD scheme 
were receiving returns denominated in foreign currency, whereas the banks were 
holding their assets in rupees, and the foreign exchange risk was borne by the SBP. 
Put it differently, the banks in effect had dollar assets because the SBP was providing 
the forward cover, and the SBP had the exchange risk. The high returns on FCDs 
reflected in part the banks passing on some of the subsidies to depositors.  
Since the SBP ran up huge losses in providing this foreign exchange cover to 
the commercial banks, there was effectively a wedge between the return on the assets 
and liabilities side of the banks’ balance sheets. In contrast, the transformation of 
banking from an interest-based system to one that relies on profit sharing makes 
Islamic banking system an essentially equity-based system, and the returns on bank 
 
18Yaqub (2003), p. 98. 
19See, for example, Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987), and Mirakhor (1988). Although interest rate controls 
were discontinued with the introduction of Islamic banking, which had the effect of making the cost of borrowing 
more flexible, but the guidelines for calculating profit rates to pay on even domestic currency deposits continued 
to constrain flexibility because they could only be adjusted once every six months. 
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deposits cannot be determined ex ante. Moreover, it should be stressed that an 
Islamic financial system has a number of features that distinguish it from the interest-
based system, and the absence of a fixed or predetermined interest rate is only one 
such feature. Indeed, one of the most important characteristic of an Islamic financial 
system is that there is a close link between the real sector and the financial sector, 
and FCDs are not the natural instrument for strengthening such linkages. By contrast, 
there are several other alternatives that could serve this purpose better, including 
denominating private debt in terms of nontradable goods, or alternatively, GDP-
indexed financial instruments, which we discuss in Section IV of this paper.20  
The State Bank had advanced proposals in the mid–1990s to address the FCD 
problem, but these attempts did not go very far and were attacked from many sides. 
Much of the criticism was not surprising. Commercial bankers, for instance, were not 
keen to give up their lucrative business dealings in FCDs, particularly as regards the 
holding of counterpart funds to these deposits in high yielding domestic public debt, with 
the central bank absorbing the exchange rate risks. Meanwhile, depositors wanted hedges 
against high inflation, and found the FCDs to be a convenient means for protecting their 
savings. Above all else, whereas the officials in the Ministry of Finance were concerned 
about the losses on account of forward cover operations by the central bank, they were 
not willing to acknowledge how the FCD scheme came into being in the first place to 
plug the holes in the balance of payments accounts, attributed in no small part to the 
fiscal imbalances. In short, the various sectors of the government were unwilling to take 
the bold steps needed to sharply reduce the budget deficits, and build up the international 
reserves to be used as a cushion for weathering the portfolio shifts that would have 
invariably occurred if major changes were to be effected in the implementation of the 
FCD scheme. Indeed, the opposition from the various quarters was such that the SBP 
would end up pushing modified proposals with the hope that perhaps at least a diluted 
version of the original proposal would be accepted. Unfortunately, these latter steps 
proved to be a tall task as well, and suggestions such as simply raising the forward cover 
fee on the FCD deposits to eliminate the losses on those operations were greeted with 
considerable skepticism, and required major efforts from SBP management to gain their 
acceptance.  
 
(b)  Borrowed International Reserves Versus Current Account Adjustment  
The economy had been experiencing a slowdown in activity and mounting 
debt-servicing difficulties since the early-1990s, and the potential for disorderly bank 
runs and capital flight had been a looming danger for some time. After the nuclear 
tests of May 1998 and the international economic sanctions, the government decided 
that it had no choice but to abandon the convertibility of foreign currency deposits to 
avoid a financial panic. While this action lifted a huge burden off the economy, it 
 
20See Chamon (2001), for the case of denominating private foreign debt in terms of a nontraded 
good, and Borensztein and Mauro (2002), for the case of GDP-indexed bonds. 
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also created a policy credibility problem. Unfortunately, the “Government did not 
take the public into confidence by explaining the implications for the economy of the 
alternative of keeping open the window for the withdrawal of foreign currency 
deposits in the context of meagre foreign exchange reserves and heightened 
economic uncertainty...There was a strong public to the decision on foreign currency 
deposits...”21 International reserves were only a small portion of total FCDs and even 
a modest run on reserves would have led to the depletion of the total reserve stock 
and a collapsing exchange rate. The short-term liabilities in the form of FCDs were a 
multiple of the reserve holdings, which meant that the incentive to run, hedge and 
cover currency risk were massive under the international economic sanctions. Most 
observers took the view that there would inevitably be speculative attacks on the 
rupee. While the costs of shorting the rupee had been made high and could have been 
made higher still by further spikes in the interest rate, it was decided that this might 
not prevent a run on the reserves (if capital controls and a freeze on FCDs were not 
imposed) as the expected benefits of covering currency positions were higher than 
any sustainable short-term interest rate.  
The point that Pakistan should have had large holdings of unborrowed 
international reserves is supported by numerous studies on reserves and adjustment. The 
demand for international liquidity is a function of the scale and variability of the 
transactions, which flow through a country’s foreign exchange market, including the 
level of imports of goods and services, size of external debt-servicing, fluctuations in 
export proceeds, etc. For example, econometric estimation of demand for liquidity 
functions suggest that those countries that tend to have, among other things, larger 
variations in export earnings and greater external debt servicing burdens should have 
relatively larger international liquidity-GDP ratios. These and other results, which are not 
mentioned for the sake of brevity, would suggest that Pakistan should have held sizable 
international reserves, but that was not the policy pursued by the authorities. Furthermore, 
not only did the country not meet this demand for relatively higher international liquidity, 
but even its limited international reserve holdings were acquired through external 
borrowing. These borrowed reserves as opposed to owned reserves created the twin 
problems of the expensive cost of external borrowing relative to the return earned on 
holdings of reserve assets, as well as the limited ability to supplement the reserve 
holdings in times of need through private borrowing.22  
 
21Yaqub (2003), page 100. 
22Industrial countries can count on the availability of private lines of credit at all times and have 
found borrowed reserves to be an efficient and reliable source of international liquidity. However, 
Pakistan did not have the same potential to borrow from private sources to finance temporary balance of 
payments deficits at all times; even when it did have access to international capital markets, there was the 
problem that the country would find that when it approached the private sources for international liquidity 
in times of need, it ended up signaling the balance of payments difficulties, which resulted in sharply 
higher borrowing costs. This supports the conventional wisdom that the ratios of reserves to imports for 
the developing countries should generally be higher than those for the industrial countries. 
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Several prominent economists have advanced proposals that additional 
measures are required to augment the capacity of governments in emerging markets 
to reduce these countries’ exposure to capital account crises. Among the self-
protection policies, Greenspan (1999) has suggested that it might be prudent for 
countries to hold foreign currency reserves in the amount of total external debt 
maturing within one year. This proposal revises the traditional rule of thumb that 
foreign reserves should cover three to four months of imports to a rule based on 
short-term debt amortisation. If the Pakistani authorities were to have adopted this 
proposal, then in the 1990s, they would have been keeping international reserves at 
levels which would have been several times the actual levels for most years. This 
gives some indication of the severity of the problem, and while we present the details 
below, at this juncture, it might be sufficient to say that just the costs of holding 
those reserves in terms of interest rates on borrowed reserves or import compression 
to acquire unborrowed reserves would have been of the order of several hundred 
million dollars.  
Another recommendation that is often included in the self-protection policies 
is for countries to arrange contingent lines of credit, which would effectively mean 
the purchase of an option to borrow reserves if and when needed to avoid illiquidity 
during a crisis. While this proposal raises the interesting question of whether these 
lines of credit should be arranged with private creditors or should be provided by the 
international financial institutions, in the present context of the underinsurance 
problem in Pakistan, it helps to clarify the point that the FCD scheme had embedded 
in it huge hidden costs that were not immediately apparent.23  We mention this 
option to suggest that if one were to approximate the costs of purchasing such an 
option in the financial markets, they would have been seen to be an unbearable 
burden on the budget. Needless to say, we are not necessarily recommending that the 
authorities should have purchased insurance in the international capital markets to 
close the open foreign exchange position on account of the FCDs, because this 
proposal would have to be evaluated in relation to the costs of other policies that 
could have served the same purpose, including policies that would have reduced the 
reliance on FCDs for savings mobilisation (e.g., fiscal and monetary policies aimed 
at low inflation and exchange rate stability, which would have made financial 
instruments denominated in domestic currency more attractive to savers).  
Putting aside for the moment the issue of credit rationing in international 
capital markets and calculating the net carrying costs of reserves for the country by 
focusing only on the difference between its cost of acquiring reserves and the yield 
on its reserve assets, one finds that even under this scenario the costs for Pakistan 
were high. For the industrial countries, borrowing from private international capital 
markets is a low-cost and flexible source of international reserves, and the net cost of 
borrowed reserves for these countries when it is measured as the difference between 
 
23See Caballero (2003). 
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the loan interest rate and the yield obtained on reserve assets is almost negligible. In 
recent years, the net interest cost of holding reserves for industrial countries have 
been estimated to have averaged less than 1 percent per annum. In contrast, the 
average carrying cost of foreign exchange reserves for Pakistan in terms of the 
difference between the weighted average yield on the syndicated loans and the 
average rate of return on the reserve assets has been substantial. This is because the 
cost of lending to Pakistan, like other developing countries, is based on a formula, 
with the cost of funds to the borrower comprising the market interest rate--generally 
represented by the LIBOR or the U.S. prime rate—plus a margin or spread. The 
interest rate fluctuates over the maturity of the loan and the spreads over LIBOR 
vary according to the perceived risks associated with lending to a particular country 
as well as with the degree of liquidity in international capital markets. The LIBOR 
itself can be regarded as consisting of a “risk-free” interest rate, which could be 
represented by the U.S. treasury bill rate and an additional margin or banking spread 
which reflects both the cost of bank intermediation and the risk premiums that banks 
have to pay in funding their own lending. This banking spread has varied 
considerably over time and is significantly influenced by financial developments in 
industrial countries. Since the probability of running into debt service difficulties is 
increased with higher interest rates in the international capital markets, the banking 
spread tends to rise to reflect this increase risk. Pakistan’s cost of external borrowing 
has fluctuated sharply, and for some years has been well into the double digit levels.  
Lenders to Pakistan have also resorted to structured finance or 
collateralisation to shift the financing risk to the country. One technique to mitigate 
transfer and exchange rate risks has been to establish escrow accounts and to use 
future export receivables as collateral for the commercial loan (for example, the 
receivables from Pakistan Telekom were used in one such transaction). As is well 
known, however, these techniques may have negative macroeconomic implications if 
pursued too vigorously or if risk-sharing attributes are skewed too heavily against the 
borrowing country. The earmarking of foreign exchange revenues for particular 
creditors may reduce the country’s flexibility in responding to a balance of payments 
crisis. Such contracts may also set prices at significantly below market levels. All 
this would suggest that the interest rate on a commercial bank loan does not fully 
reflect the cost of holding reserves when Pakistan had borrowed in international 
capital markets.  
 
(c)  FCDs and the Costs of Accumulating Reserves  
The above discussion has stressed that to accumulate reserves through 
external borrowing, Pakistan incurred significant interest costs because of the 
spreads between borrowing rates and the rates of return on reserve assets. On the 
other hand, if reserves were to be accumulated through the compression of domestic 
demand and net imports, then the country would incur even greater costs in terms of 
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foregone consumption or investment. The reason why it is optimal to pay those costs 
is that there are benefits from holding reserves. The alternative of not doing so would 
be to accept greater vulnerability to abrupt changes in the availability of external 
borrowing and in undertaking rapid import compressions and current account 
adjustments. However, those costs cannot be saved if the reserve holding are 
augmented through foreign currency deposits.  
While FCDs provided additional foreign exchange inflow, they did not 
constitute resources that were available on net terms, e.g., to defend the rupee against 
a speculative attack. At first glance, it might seem that cost savings accrue when 
reserves are acquired through FCDs rather than through external borrowings, 
because there appears to be a wedge between the interest cost of external borrowing 
and the cost of providing forward cover for those FCDs throughout most of the 
sample period. In this sense, reserve accumulation through the mobilisation of FCDs 
can be said to provide resource gains for the country. Unfortunately, the lower cost 
of adding to reserves via FCDs mobilisation are more apparent than real. These costs 
are understated because the continued build-up of the deposits meant that the SBP 
had to provide the foreign exchange cover. In other words, the costs were hidden in 
terms of the open foreign exchange position of the SBP. Furthermore, the simple 
analysis that only takes into account the cost of the FCDs overlooks the possibility of 
an offsetting increase in the cost of external borrowing from other private sources. In 
particular, it should be noted that the interest rate that a country is charged in private 
financial markets on a sovereign loan reflects the perceptions of market participants 
regarding the riskiness of lending to that country as well as to the specific borrower. 
Furthermore, if private creditors were to adopt the view that Pakistan would service 
its foreign exchange obligations to the depositors in the banking system with greater 
priority than its obligations to other private markets, then a significant increase in 
FCDs would lead private creditors to believe that the likelihood of repayment of their 
claims had been reduced. Consequently, the risk premium charged on borrowing 
from private credit markets would rise if the total risks associated with lending to the 
country was perceived to have risen and any savings from FCDs would be offset by 
the higher costs of borrowed reserves.  
 
(d)  FCDs, Underinsurance, and International Collateral  
This section provides a perspective on the problems of FCDs and the lack of 
international reserve holdings in terms of the dual liquidity model developed by 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy.24 The dual-liquidity model focuses on the financial 
constraints affecting borrowing and lending among agents within the domestic 
economy, which are quite distinct from those affecting borrowing from foreign 
lenders. In particular, the analysis sheds light on how the wrong incentives from the 
 
24Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003, and 2004). 
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FCD scheme affected the behaviour of firms and banks, and led to the 
underinsurance problem, whereas the authorities were doing the opposite of what 
would have been considered an appropriate policy for international liquidity 
management.  
In the Caballero-Krishnamurthy model, international liquidity constraint is 
defined as that situation in which domestic agents have sufficient collateral to 
borrow from other domestic agents, but cannot borrow from foreigners because the 
country has a shortage of international collateral. The model assumes that when a 
firm experiences a negative shock, it first borrows against its net international 
collateral from foreigners, and finances the remaining financing needs from other 
domestic firms that did not receive the shock. The analysis helps to show how the 
presence of financial constraints causes domestic firms to undervalue the social 
benefit of borrowing in the local currency, which has several interesting results 
implications for exchange market pressures and the conduct of monetary policy.  
In what Caballero and Krishnamurthy have dubbed the vertical framework, 
international reserves are an important component of liquidity, because here the 
supply of international liquidity is inelastic, with foreign investors unwilling to 
provide additional funds and domestic agents resorting to hoarding whatever little 
they have of international liquidity. In this connection, Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
recommend that central banks should accumulate international reserves during 
capital inflow booms and reverse them during external crises. With regards to 
monetary policy, it would appear that most central banks have loss functions that aim 
at finding the right trade-off between the losses from output variability against the 
benefits of maintaining an inflation target. In the vertical framework, a central bank 
will see no output stabilisation benefits from pursuing an expansionary monetary 
policy and only inflation-target losses, and therefore will not conduct a 
countercyclical policy in the crisis situation (see Appendix I). However, the cost of 
not pursuing the countercyclical monetary policy is that the private sector will 
underinsure against such events. It is this problem of the private sector tending to 
underinsure against an external crisis by over-borrowing that leads to the authors’ 
suggestion that the government and the central bank will have to take precautionary 
measures, including taxes on capital flows and building up international reserves.  
Caballero and Krishnamurthy’s analysis provides insights into the constraints 
faced by the policymakers in Pakistan, and in particular, their vertical framework 
forms the basis for an analysis, which is geared towards formulating prescriptions for 
optimal policies. An important insight from this analysis is that the private sector 
tends to underinsure against external crisis. The private sector borrows too much 
dollar debt, thereby making the country less liquid in the international market than is 
socially optimal.  
We have discussed the dual liquidity model in Appendix I in detail to show 
how the private sector underinsurance problem was aggravated by the policy of 
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encouraging the mobilisation of FCDs in Pakistan. One important policy implication 
of this model is that since the private sector on its own carries too little international 
liquidity, the central bank should attempt to attenuate this problem by carrying 
additional international liquidity in the place of the private sector. In particular, since 
financial constraints cause domestic firms to undervalue the social cost of borrowing 
in the foreign currency, the authorities should take measures to mitigate the 
underinsurance problem by proactively managing international reserves. 
Unfortunately, the Pakistani authorities did not proactively manage the international 
reserves, attributed mainly to the persistent fiscal deficits. Also, the way in which the 
FCDs were mobilised (e.g., the preferential tax treatment on these deposits and the 
provision of forward cover for these deposits at subsidised rates) led to an excessive 
growth of these short-term foreign liabilities.  
The sharp increase in FCDs had destabilising effects on domestic borrowing 
costs, international reserves management, and more generally on monetary policy. A 
shift from FCDs into foreign cash or capital outflow would create a shortage of 
liquidity in the domestic banking system and raise the cost of borrowing in the 
economy. To be sure, a drawdown of domestic currency deposits into foreign 
exchange would have a similar effect, but the point is that these vulnerabilities were 
created by the relaxation of capital controls on account of the FCD scheme. This 
shift would also create foreign exchange market pressure, and lead either to a 
drawdown of international reserves or rupee depreciation. Since FCDs made it easier 
to transfer funds abroad, or to substitute foreign cash for savings held in the banking 
system, in the event of a shortage of foreign exchange, the difficulties would be 
compounded because at the very time when the country would want to husband its 
foreign exchange resources, there might be leakages of foreign exchange from the 
banking system. Thus, when there was a balance of payments crisis, owners of 
resident and nonresident foreign currency accounts would be concerned about 
country risk, and they would convert their holdings into foreign cash or shift them 
abroad, which would accelerate the depletion of international reserves.  
 
(e)  Implications of FCDs for Financial Policies  
The major advantage of having foreign currency deposits is that they provide 
residents with a reliable store of value in periods of high inflation and currency 
depreciation, which helps to avoid the problems of low domestic savings when rates 
of return are low or highly variable. However, this has to be balanced against the 
major disadvantage of posing formidable challenges to the policymakers in terms of 
hindering monetary control and exchange rate management in an environment of low 
international reserve holdings, as well as causing quasi-fiscal losses and the erosion 
of the tax base. In weighing the benefits from large foreign currency deposits against 
the costs, it would appear that these deposits had grown so large under the original 
scheme that the benefits were being swamped by the costs. FCDs could have helped 
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to build up international reserves or to allow foreign savings to finance investment, 
but unfortunately these benefits did not materialise.  
Furthermore, the large volume of foreign currency deposits, the specific 
institutional characteristics of those deposits, especially under the original scheme, 
and the changing share of FCDs in total money supply had constrained the conduct 
of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies in a number of ways. Monetary policy 
was affected because FCDs permitted greater substitutability between domestic and 
foreign assets, as well as by effecting changes in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. The principal channels through which fiscal policy was affected 
were the erosion of the tax base, lowering of nontax revenues, and limitations on 
seigniorage revenues from a given inflation target. Exchange rate policy was 
constrained by losses from the forward cover operations on FCDs, and by concerns 
about possible perverse international capital flows and self-fulfilling expectations 
regarding a foreign exchange shortage.  
 
Monetary Policy  
One constraint on the conduct of monetary policy related to the implications 
that the FCDs had for the money supply process, including difficulties in the 
implementation of the reserve money management program. The large and 
changing share of FCDs in the money supply had altered the behavioural relations 
between reserve money (operational target), broad money (intermediate target), 
and the ultimate objective of controlling inflation. The State Bank, which 
conducted its open market operations to achieve a reserve money target that would 
also achieve its intermediate target of broad money, found achieving its inflation 
objectives more difficult. In particular, the dollarisation process had lowered the 
demand for domestic cash balances. Furthermore, the achievement of the reserve 
money target was itself constrained by the movements of foreign capital, because 
reserve money demand had become more sensitive to monetary policy’s effects on 
domestic rates of returns.  
Yet another constraint on monetary policy was that when the SBP sought to 
defend the rupee by increasing the return on domestic currency assets, this also 
increased the cost of funding for banks, and if the policy were pursued with 
sufficient vigour, some banks would have had to contract their portfolios by calling 
in their loans. However, there was the concern that if borrowers were unable to repay 
immediately, not least because much of the short-term lending by banks was for 
“rollover loans,” then that might set in motion the beginnings of a banking crisis. On 
the other hand, if the SBP did not defend the exchange rate but allowed it to float 
more freely, then there was not only the problem of the large public sector foreign 
currency-denominated debt, but also the issue that some firms might get caught in 
the currency mismatches. Moreover, as if these were not enough constraints on the 
conduct of monetary policy, there was the problem of the losses on the SBP’s own 
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balance sheet from exchange rate depreciation, which we discussed earlier in the 
context of the provision of forward cover for the FCDs by the SBP.  
 
Fiscal Policy  
With regard to fiscal policy, FCDs had adversely affected the mobilisation of 
both tax and nontax revenues. In the case of nontax revenues, the provision of 
forward cover by the SBP to the commercial banks on their FCDs resulted in lower 
central bank’s profits, because the charges on the provision of forward cover had 
been less than the losses from rupee depreciation, except for 1994-95. In the case of 
tax revenues, FCDs had eroded the tax base for financial assets because unlike the 
income from domestic currency denominated assets, FCDs were exempt from all 
taxes. Since there had been a steady substitution of FCDs for domestic currency 
denominated assets in the portfolios of residents over the years, the tax base in the 
financial sector was lower than what it would have been otherwise, and this meant 
that the inflationary consequences of a given fiscal deficit were more severe.  
Turning to external debt issues, the large build-up of foreign currency deposits 
created both a “destabilising” and debt-servicing burden for the country.25  As is the 
case with other forms of short-term capital inflows, foreign currency deposits held by 
nonresidents not only caused the stock of foreign debt to increase relative to GDP 
but also created additional difficulties in terms of the need to rollover maturing 
deposits on a continuing basis. The average interest rate on foreign currency deposits 
was more than twice that on Pakistan’s medium- and long-term debt towards the end 
of the original FCD scheme. With the volume of such debt being about double that 
of short-term deposits, debt servicing on foreign currency deposits was of the same 
magnitude as on medium- and long-term foreign debt.  
 
Exchange Rate Policy  
One way in which exchange rate policy was affected by FCDs was in terms of 
the risks arising from perverse international capital flows. Although there are many 
determinants of international capital flows, and indeed many channels through which 
 
25Experience in many developing countries suggests an upper bound on the potential magnitude 
and sustainability of short-term capital inflows. A key factor that influences the sustainability of those 
inflows is the degree to which external resources add to overall investment in the economy and whether 
the profitability of those investments is higher than the cost of external borrowing. Furthermore, the form 
of the capital inflow—foreign direct investment, portfolio capital, or short-term bank lending—has a 
bearing on the sustainability of capital inflows. Regarding sustainability, two points need to be stressed 
about the FCDs in Pakistan. First, it would be a case of mismanagement of maturities if Pakistan were to 
incur short-term financial liabilities to finance long-term investments in physical capital. Second, foreign 
capital inflows such as nonresident FCDs can substitute for domestic savings, and the data for Pakistan 
show that at least a part of the foreign savings was used to finance consumption and not physical 
investment. See Golsbrough and Zaidi (1986); Hook (1997); Mirakhor and Montiel (1987); and Mirakhor 
and Zaidi (2004). 
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even just one of those determinants, that is, exchange rate, affects the inflow of 
capital, it is generally assumed that an exchange rate depreciation would lead to 
capital inflows. In the simple model in which domestic and foreign assets are gross 
substitutes and agents keep relatively fixed shares of the various assets, a currency 
depreciation would lead to capital inflows, because the share of foreign assets would 
be increased by the currency depreciation. However, when substantial foreign-
currency-denominated assets are held by residents in the domestic banking system, 
the currency depreciation lowers the share in portfolios of assets denominated in 
domestic currency, but that share need not be restored through an inflow of foreign 
capital but could be done by a substitution from FCDs into domestic assets. In this 
situation, since there is no need for an inflow of foreign capital for portfolio 
reallocation purposes, one important channel for foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation through an exchange rate depreciation is essentially blocked.  
 
IV. FCDS AND THE USE OF NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR  
DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
 
(a) Recent Increase in International Reserves and External Borrowing  
Before turning to a discussion of recommendations for fixing the FCD scheme 
and its related policies, we first discuss a striking recent development and one which is 
totally at odds with the experience of the past two decades, namely, the substantial 
increase in the foreign exchange reserves during 2001–04. Since the country embarked 
on the most recent economic adjustment program, its foreign exchange reserves have 
increased from less than a billion dollars (few weeks’ worth of imports) to more than 
US$12 billion. This is a historical high not only in nominal terms, but more 
importantly in relation to imports and short-term foreign liabilities. Clearly, Pakistan is 
better placed now than before to withstand external shocks, such as sharp increases in 
international interest rates and oil prices. Indeed, the authorities have indicated that 
reserves have reached such a comfortable level that they are in a position to repay in 
advance of maturity some of the more expensive external debt. In this connection, we 
would like to suggest that this might be an appropriate time to give consideration to the 
possibility of issuing some innovative debt instruments. In other words, as steps are 
taken to retire some of the more costly debt, and even though there would be retirement 
of debt on a net basis, there might still be some scope for direct substitution of new 
instruments for the old debt. At the same time, we would like to put in a word of 
caution and reiterate the point - 22 - noted above regarding the difficulties involved in 
trying to identify a prudent level of reserves. This is not to deny that if the costs of 
holding reserves are too high, then it is reasonable to think about the alternative paths 
that would lead to a lowering of reserves.  
There may well be a strong argument for Pakistan to use its reserves to repay 
some of its costly external debt, but the Pakistan economy is subjected to significant 
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shocks that are associated with agriculture, and concomitant with the recent reserve 
accumulation has been the massive increase in FCDs, albeit not under the original 
scheme but the new scheme (the data in Tables 2 and 3 are for the original scheme). 
Furthermore, while it is to be recognised that official debt rescheduling, increased 
foreign assistance, and strengthened demand management contributed to the recent 
unprecedented accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, another important engine 
for the rise in reserves has been private external transfers. However, there are some 
downside risks associated with the private transfers, and it should be stressed that the 
private inflows that have materialised in the past couple of years are not easy to 
explain. In particular, these inflows might well be linked to stock adjustment 
measures in the post-9/11 world, and might not continue on this high growth path or 
might even reverse quickly. Also, we hope that by now we have stressed amply the 
private sector underinsurance problem, and the need for the public sector to take 
offsetting measures. All these factors suggest that a high level of reserves is probably 
the best option at the present juncture, without necessarily implying that one should 
close the door on considering the other alternatives, especially if reserves continue to 
grow strongly.  
Some of the problems with the original FCD scheme such as the provision of 
forward cover by the SBP are not present in the new FCD scheme, but there remain 
some other outstanding issues in addition to the problems just discussed regarding 
the constraints on financial policies. In particular, one difficult issue that has 
emerged with the new scheme is that instead of using the scarce national savings to 
finance much-needed domestic investment, the commercial banks have limited 
flexibility as to how to use the funds generated by the FCD deposits. Whereas 
sufficiently detailed bank-by-bank data are not available to allow one to assess the 
open forex position of individual banks, it is the case that all banks respect the limit 
on their net foreign exchange position (10 percent of capital); in fact it appears that 
most are likely to hold long open positions. Furthermore, there are additional 
prudential constraints on such positions, e.g., FCDs must not exceed 20 percent of 
deposits and domestic foreign exchange-loans are strictly limited to export finance.  
Although the prudential measure of restricting FCDs to less than 20 percent of 
deposits serves some useful purposes, it does have a major disquieting feature in that 
it imposes an arbitrary constraint on the mobilisation of savings in the domestic 
banking system. For instance, if expatriate Pakistanis had a particular need to keep 
their savings in foreign currency or there were policy-induced or other exogenous 
shocks, which were to shift the asset preferences of domestic residents in favour of 
foreign currency denomination (e.g., a greater need for a hedge against exchange rate 
depreciation or inflation), this policy measure runs the risk of imposing a ceiling on 
how much of the savings could go into the domestic banking system. Thus, these 
potential savings would either not enter/remain in the country or be kept outside the 
banking system as foreign currency notes. Also, the strict limit on domestic foreign 
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exchange loans means that once a bank has exhausted its export finance options, it 
has to either keep the proceeds of its FCDs with the SBP or hold them as deposits 
abroad. Indeed, most of the foreign exchange assets held by banks are deposits with 
correspondent banks abroad, foreign bills purchased and discounted, and foreign 
exchange deposits with the SBP. In a country where paucity of savings is a major 
constraint and there is an overriding need to promote financial intermediation and 
private investment, this state of affairs does not appear to be a very attractive option.  
With regard to private savings, the modification of the NSS to facilitate a level 
playing field for commercial banks should be a high priority. The rates of profit paid 
on the NSS instruments should be adjusted to be more in line with their risk and 
maturity characteristics. In this connection, a major step was taken in 2001 when the 
authorities decided to auction the Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIB)26 and to use them 
as benchmarks for NSS rates, which resulted in significant reduction in public debt 
service. In the medium term, the government can further improve public debt 
management and the by eliminating all on-tap instruments and auction only a few 
instruments such as the treasury bills or the PIBs through primary dealers. The tax 
system continues to discriminate against banks, despite the reduction in income tax 
rates on banks in 2002 from 58 percent to 50 percent, as it is still above the corporate 
tax rate.27  While much more could fruitfully be said in this area, we shall confine 
ourselves in the following paragraphs to a few specific financial sector reforms that 
might be helpful both with regards the mobilisation of savings and the dollarisation 
problem.  
 
(b) Indexed Financial Instruments  
As mentioned in the literature on the “original sin” regarding currency 
mismatches in foreign borrowing, there are several constraints that seemingly 
preclude borrowing abroad in domestic currency for most countries.28 Nevertheless, 
there is some debate about whether it might be possible to overcome some of these 
difficulties if the emerging market countries were to issue inflation-indexed debt. On 
one side are the opponents of indexation, who point out that if the policymakers were 
to develop a market for indexed debt, then they might end up encouraging further 
indexation in the economy and that by reducing the costs of inflation they may 
actually raise it in equilibrium, thereby worsening welfare because an economy can 
never be fully indexed.29  However, this cost has to be balanced against the cost of 
having foreign-currency-denominated debt, because the choice for emerging market 
 
26Pakistan Investment Bonds are long-term fixed-income bonds. 
27It should be noted that the income tax rates for banks have been reduced to 44 percent for the 
tax year 2003-04 and will be further reduced to the corporate tax rate of 35 percent by tax year 2006-07. 
28See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), and Hausman, Panizza, and Stein (2001). 
29Fischer and Summers (1989), present a model where social welfare can indeed decrease by the 
introduction of measures that reduce the costs of inflation. 
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economies is not between nominal versus inflation indexed debt but rather between 
inflation indexed versus foreign currency debt. The proponents of indexed debt argue 
that self-fulfilling liquidity crises have adversely affected the macroeconomic 
performance of many emerging market countries, and if it can be shown that a 
market for inflation-indexed debt instruments would serve to attenuate these crises, 
then a case could be made for these types of instruments, notwithstanding the well-
known problems associated with indexation such as structural rigidities and inflation 
inertia.  
Borensztein and Mauro (2002) discuss how countries can self-insure against 
economic growth slowdowns by issuing GDP-indexed bonds. They simulate the 
effects of GDP indexed bonds under different assumptions about fiscal policy 
reaction functions, and their results show that these bonds would help to substantially 
reduce the likelihood that debt/GDP paths become explosive. The insurance 
premium would likely be small, because cross-country comovement of GDP growth 
rates is low and cross-country GDP growth risk is thus largely diversifiable for an 
investor holding a portfolio of GDP-indexed bonds. The authors emphasise that 
while their paper focuses on GDP risk for the sake of simplicity, it should be clear 
that there are many sources of risk affecting the debt-service capacity of emerging 
markets. For example, one could instead focus on the external terms of trade risk, 
which would suggest the idea of debt instruments that are adjusted to the world price 
of some key commodity.  
Chamon (2001) develops a model to analyse the implications for financial 
crises of denominating external borrowing in terms of a nontraded good, which 
would be similar to having a domestic inflation indexed debt instrument. Chamon’s 
model is designed to analyse the implications for self-fulfilling liquidity crises when 
foreign debt is denominated in terms of the price of nontraded goods. The analysis 
shows that a major advantage of having the indexed debt instrument is that it 
provides a mechanism that adjusts the value of the debt so that all creditors can be 
repaid in the event of a debt run. A liquidity crises may be avoided, because when 
there is a decline in the value of the debt following the decline in the price of 
nontraded goods, then all creditors share in this loss because they hold indexed debt. 
Furthermore, since the creditors will receive an amount that is independent of the 
order in which they collect their debts, they will have not have any incentives to join 
in a debt run. In other words, the mechanism for avoiding liquidity crises relies on 
the decline in the relative price of the nontraded good in anticipation of the 
liquidation of the traded good production, if there were to be a debt run.  
To some observers, however, any recommendation for any sort of indexation 
in the economy would appear to be akin to one which gives up the fight against 
inflation and sees the option as one of trying to minimise the costs of inflation by 
indexing particular assets. One cost that has been frequently emphasised in the 
literature relates to the weakening of the will to continue the fight against inflation: 
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results derived from theoretical economic models as well as empirical evidence from 
countries that have practiced indexation show that changes that reduce the social 
costs of inflation increase the equilibrium inflation rate and tend to worsen social 
welfare. This point takes on added importance in the Pakistani context because there 
are some widely cited studies, which have argued that there is greater scope for 
seigniorage in the Pakistan economy than has been realised by the Government. It 
would take us too far a field to discuss all of the issues involved in the wage and 
price indexation literature, and we shall confine ourselves here to referring the reader 
to the many studies that have been done in - 25 - this area.30  In particular, Mirakhor 
and Zaidi (2004) have provided several counter-arguments against inflationary 
financing of the budget deficit in Pakistan. Their study provides both the analytical 
underpinnings for the case for pursuing noninflationary fiscal and monetary policies 
as well as points to several weaknesses in the empirical studies purporting to make a 
case for higher inflation in Pakistan. One point that bears emphasis is the evidence 
from cross-country studies that once indexation becomes popular in the economy, it 
becomes very difficult to reverse the trend toward increasing indexation. In the 
present context, we would like to stress that it is necessary to distinguish between 
indexing that decreases the costs of unanticipated inflation to the government from 
that which does not. In particular, indexing of bonds reduces the gains from 
unanticipated inflation to the government, because the mechanism for eroding the 
real value of public debt is thwarted, and insofar as that advantage is checked, this 
particular financial indexation would not necessarily encourage higher inflation.  
There are some other difficulties associated with indexed instruments, which 
might be worth noting. In particular, if there were to be differential rates of 
indexation on bank loans and deposits, then this would result in exposure to inflation 
risk that must be borne by the banking system, or if they were to become particularly 
large, by the public sector in terms of bank bailouts. However, the need to address 
these issues does not at all mean that the introduction of the innovative financial 
instruments faces insurmountable obstacles or has to be delayed for a long time. On 
the contrary, we think that this is an opportune time to effect major structural reforms 
to place the financial system on a sound footing. Until such time as the innovative 
schemes are introduced in the banking system, there remains the question of what to 
do with the large increase in FCDs. The current set-up of tight limits on the banks’ 
net foreign exchange position, as well as limiting domestic foreign exchange loans to 
export finance, has the major advantage of controlling foreign exchange risks in the 
banking system. However, this advantage has to be compared with the foregone 
benefits that would come from using the savings for investment in physical capital in 
the domestic economy. Put it differently, how does one trade off these two 
combinations of pluses and minuses: on the one hand, there is the low risk in the 
domestic banking system but at the cost of having savings going abroad in the form 
 
30See, for example, Fischer and Summers (1989). 
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of low return (partly because of low risk) foreign financial assets; on the other hand, 
one can count on higher investment rates in the economy to bolster the growth 
performance but then also face the potential problem from increasing the banks’ 
exposure to foreign exchange and credit risks. It might require another paper to 
answer these questions fully, but based on the extensive discussion about the 
savings-investment constraint in Mirakhor and Zaidi (2004), as well as the analysis 
we have provided in Section III above on the cost of acquiring international reserves 
and sustaining growth-oriented adjustment programs, we would put a lot of emphasis 
on adequate international reserve holdings or using the savings for investment 
purposes as long as there are adequate safeguards.31  
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analysed how the large volume of short-term foreign 
currency deposits and the specific institutional characteristics of those deposits 
had made the Pakistan economy highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks. While 
emphasising the importance of linking capital account liberalisation to the 
appropriate sequencing of domestic financial reforms (and bank supervision), the 
paper also focused on the problem that the FCD scheme had created yet another 
channel for government borrowing. The analysis showed that fiscal sustainability 
in a “closed” system may be very different from sustainability in a more “open” 
system, and there is a need to think of these issues in terms of total balance sheet 
vulnerability. The main reason for the reliance on short-term capital had been the 
large fiscal deficits, and there is a continuing need for strengthening financial 
policies to promote internal and external stability. The authorities should 
continue to integrate the economy with international financial markets, because 
foreign capital inflows can help to finance investment and provide opportunities 
 
31To the extent that there might be further dollarisation in the banking system on both the asset 
and liabilities sides, the SBP will have to be vigilant in ensuring that nonperforming loans (NPLs) do not 
become a problem, particularly with regard to the strategies followed by the banks and the credit risks on 
their dollar loans. Banking supervision entails a feedback-control process involving continuous and timely 
interaction between the central bank and the financial institutions, particularly the review and analysis of 
data submitted by the commercial banks. Hence, SBP should continue to develop its ability to be well-
informed in a timely way about the trends and any undesirable developments in the banking industry and 
be able to take appropriate and rapid policy measures when necessary. Further progress should be made to 
gather relevant data from the supervised institutions, with the focus on obtaining less frequent but more 
meaningful information. In this connection, financial institutions should provide comprehensive reports on 
a quarterly basis, which would reflect their financial positions accurately. In particular, there should be 
complete income statements in the quarterly reports, which would show details on all accruals, 
amortisation, and updated reserves for nonperforming assets. It is in this respect that SBP should intensify 
the work on an early warning system for any deterioration in the loan portfolios of banks, which would be 
based on a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive database. The early warning system would rely in the 
first instance on off-site prudential supervision with a view to identifying problem banks requiring 
additional supervisory attention. Also, SBP should have a well functioning system for financial analysis of 
the quarterly returns from banks. 
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for risk diversification to residents, but they will have to be extra vigilant on the 
fiscal front. To quote from Krueger (2004): “It is clear from experience that 
large unsustainable fiscal deficits and open capital markets make uncomfortable 
bedfellows. Large fiscal deficits pose increasing risks for the financial sector as 
capital flows are freed up. And here I want to emphasise that deficits financed in 
large part by domestic creditors can be especially dangerous”.32  
The vulnerability of Pakistan to shocks that adversely affected its balance 
of payments position depended on the terms and conditions under which it could 
obtain international liquidity. The reliance on FCDs for even the rather limited 
reserve accumulation that had been done meant that the country’s efforts to 
improve economic performance were constrained by having borrowed rather 
than owned international reserves. Even when there was access to private credit 
markets, there was the need for periodic refinancing of the borrowing undertaken 
to finance reserve holdings, and the costs of such financing had exhibited marked 
volatility. Trends in net borrowing from private creditors illustrate clearly the 
changing perceptions of Pakistan’s creditworthiness and the consequent 
availability of funds. Thus, the size of private foreign capital inflows, including 
FCDs, expressed as a ratio to GDP or to imports of goods and services varied 
considerably over time. When the country had adequate holdings of international 
reserves and access to other sources of international liquidity, it could sustain a 
smooth adjustment program because it could finance its way out of temporary 
external shocks. However, when there was inadequate liquidity, even temporary 
shocks had forced the country to modify its adjustment policies; this choice was 
often not desirable, because a sharp tightening of monetary policy would depress 
investment spending.  
This paper has emphasised that international reserve targets should be set not 
only in relation to variations in the volumes of foreign trade but also keeping in view 
the growth in short-term liabilities. As well, the analysis has pointed to the need for 
measures to enhance international liquidity, including measures that would make 
domestic currency denominated assets relatively more attractive to hold. The 
reduction in inflation, together with adequate rates of return on domestic currency 
deposits, can be expected to lead to a sustained lowering of the reliance on FCDs and 
the dollarisation of the economy. To be sure, one would expect to have some 
dollarisation in the economy even when inflation rates are low and returns on 
domestic assets are more competitive than in the past, both because of the large 
workers’ remittances and because domestic residents would want to diversify their 
portfolios. However, the volumes of foreign liabilities would be sharply lower, and 
the attendant costs and risks would be of a different order of magnitude than those 
discussed in this paper.  
 
32Krueger (2004), p. 5. 
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APPENDIX I  
CABALLERO-KRISHNAMURTHY MODEL 
The objective of this appendix is to clarify the structure and behaviour of a 
macroeconomic model for a small open economy developed by Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, as the key insights from this model were used in the main text to 
point out the constraints from the dollarisation of the economy, most notably in the 
form of large foreign currency deposits in the banking system. The model has been 
dubbed the dual liquidity model by Caballero and Krishnamurthy to emphasise the 
financial constraints affecting borrowing and lending among agents within the 
economy, and constraints affecting borrowing from foreign lenders. Since the model 
has been discussed extensively in a series of papers by Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2001, 2003, and 2004), the discussion in this section is brief and the reader is 
referred to the papers just mentioned for details. The focus of the present exposition 
is on those features of the model that are most relevant for the analysis of 
international and domestic liquidity constraints in the Pakistan economy.33  
The model consists of the following assumptions, and is represented by 
Equations (1)–(11) in Table A1. There are three periods in the model: date 0 is the 
fully flexible period in which agents make investments and financing decisions; date 
1 is the near financial crisis situation in which the domestic agents have sufficient 
collateral to borrow from other domestic agents, but cannot borrow from foreigners 
because the country has a shortage of international collateral; date 2 is the final date 
when firms pay their debt obligations. There are two states of the world at date 1, 
denoted b and g, which occur with probabilities pi and 1- pi. In the b-state, firms 
experience adverse liquidity shocks, and face binding financial constraints, while in 
the g-state, there are no shocks and financial constraints are not binding. The plants 
of one-half of the firms receive a shock with probability 0.5 at date 1 that lowers 
output from A to a. This productivity decline can be offset by investing θk goods, 
which  would  generate  the  date 2  output  depicted  in Equation 1. Equation 2 is the 
assumption that the return on investment exceeds the international interest rate, while 
in Equation 3 it is assumed that the firm first borrows against its net international 
collateral from foreigners. Once the firm has used its international collateral, it 
finances the remainder from other domestic firms that did not receive the          
shock,  which are labeled intact firms. In the horizontal view, the distressed firms are  
 
33While there is still some disagreement on the causes underlying the financial crises in emerging 
markets, in recent years most researchers have emphasised that one of the most salient feature was the 
contracting of debt denominated in foreign currency. Thus, the third generation models of currency crisis 
focus on the balance sheet mismatches that led to bankruptcies and other dislocations in the real sector, 
which had feedback effects that served to amplify the downturns. Like other third generation models of 
the currency-balance sheet channel, the dual liquidity model also relies on the assumption that firms 
contract dollar denominated debt, and provides a rigorous analysis of why firms choose (or perhaps the 
better word would be must) to take on dollar debt. 
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constrained in meeting their financing needs because they have limited liability, that 
is, their total liquidity of ak + wn is insufficient to meet the production shock. This is 
shown in Equation 4 where intact firms borrow from foreigners against the 
international collateral of n w and lend to distressed firms against the domestic 
collateral of ak. In this situation, the international financial constraint is not binding 
for intact firms, and the interest rate they charge against domestic collateral is equal 
to the international interest rate (Equation (5)). Accordingly, total investment in 
determined by the financial constraints of the individual firms, as shown in Equation 
(6), where H denotes the horizontal equilibrium. Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
denote this equilibrium situation as the horizontal view, because the domestic 
interest rate is equal to the international interest rate, and not affected by the quantity 
of domestic loans; a distressed firm can borrow as long as its domestic financial 
constraint is not binding.  
In contrast to the horizontal view, the vertical view is the situation where the 
international supply of funds is vertical, because there is a shortage of country-wide 
international liquidity, and the inequality in Equation (4) is reversed to give Equation 
Table A1. Caballero-Krishnamurthy Model 1. 
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(7). Although distressed firms have enough domestic liquidity to pay for the 
international liquidity of the intact firms, the international liquidity is scarce relative 
to the financing need, as shown in Equation (8). In this situation, investment is 
determined by the stock of international liquidity and domestic liquidity does not 
appear in Equation (9), where superscript V stands for the vertical equilibrium. In the 
vertical view, the interest rate on loans against domestic collateral is greater than the 
international interest rate, because the intact firms are borrowing up to their 
maximum capacity from foreigners and lending to domestic firms against domestic 
collateral (Equation (10)). Since the international collateral is the binding constraint 
the loan supply curve becomes vertical beyond this point. The credit market is 
segmented in this region with d 1 i > * 1 i but it does not exceed .–1, which is the 
marginal product of investment for the distressed firms, as borrowing costs cannot 
exceed the marginal product. Equation (11) is the condition that d 1 i lies between * 
1 i and .–1 after some rearrangement.  
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) sketch a model in which collateral 
aggregation is done not in the domestic debt market but in the banking system, which 
is more relevant to the case of the FCD problem in Pakistan. In this version of the 
model, intact firms deposit funds with the banks, while distressed firms take loans 
from the banks. Since the banks act as intermediaries in this model and intact firms 
do not directly purchase the debt claims of the distressed firms, sharp declines in 
asset prices lead to problems in the banking system and not in the domestic debt 
market.34 As banks experience declining asset values, their ability to aggregate 
collateral is weakened, which leads to further declines in asset prices and economic 
activity.35  
Caballero and Krishnamurthy pose the dollar debt problem as one of 
microeconomic underinsurance with respect to country-wide aggregate shocks. Their 
analysis shows that denominating external debt in domestic currency is equivalent to 
contracting the same amount of dollar-debt, but then complementing with insurance 
against shocks that depreciate the equilibrium exchange rate. They also derive the 
result that when there are country-level international financial constraints, it would 
be optimal to purchase such insurance even if all agents are risk neutral. However, if 
domestic financial constraints also exist, there is the problem that domestic residents 
 
34In the canonical model, distressed firms access the international collateral of intact firms by 
borrowing from them against their domestic collateral. The implicit assumption in the model without 
banks is that this collateral aggregation is done in a perfectly functioning public debt market. In other 
words, distressed firms issue debt claims in the domestic market secured by domestic collateral, while 
intact firms issue debt claims to foreign investors secured by international collateral. The intact firms then 
use the proceeds from this issue to purchase the debt claims of the distressed firms. 
35When banks are included in the model, it is the banks that issue claims to foreign investors 
against balance sheets that are partially backed by international collateral. When the banks provide these 
funds to distressed firms, they act as the intermediary for the intact firms extending credit to distressed 
firms against their domestic collateral. 
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will undervalue the social benefits of contracting insurance against country-wide 
shocks. Furthermore, foreign lenders will reinforce the underinsurance problem by 
reducing their participation in domestic financial markets.  
The analysis helps to clarify the constraints imposed on stabilisation policies 
in Pakistan by the FCD scheme, particularly with regard to the effect of monetary 
policy on the exchange rate. In the vertical region, if the SBP were to adopt an 
expansionary monetary policy stance, it would not be able to loosen the international 
liquidity constraint, but instead the price of domestic liquidity would decline in 
relation to the price of international liquidity.36  In this way, monetary policy would 
have distributional effects, because it would affect the allocation of the return on 
investment between lenders and borrowers. However, the SBP could not conduct 
countercyclical monetary policy in the vertical region, because investment by the 
distressed firms would be constrained by the international liquidity. Any attempt by 
the SBP to expand monetary policy would depreciate the exchange rate, and since 
the SBP would be concerned not only with the balance sheets of the firms, but also 
its own open foreign exchange position and the inflation target, it would tend to 
favour a policy that supported the exchange rate.  
The SBP’s attempts to stabilise the exchange rate in order to hit the inflation 
target and protect its balance sheet in the vertical region had the unintended effect of 
distorting the private sector’s insurance decisions concerning international liquidity 
shortages. Since countercyclical monetary policy was ineffective in stabilising output 
in the vertical region, the domestic agents (firms, banks, etc.) would take into 
account the SBP’s defense of the exchange rate when making their decisions about 
hedging against adverse shocks in the vertical situation. Insofar as the domestic 
agents expected limited exchange rate flexibility and a smaller decline in the value of 
domestic liquidity in relation to international liquidity, they would tend to 
underinsure against the possibility of finding themselves with too little international 
liquidity in the bad states of nature. In contrast, if the SBP had sufficiently large 
international reserve holdings to demonstrate the credibility and efficacy of 
countercyclical monetary policy, it would have provided the private sector with the 
right incentives to insure against international liquidity shortages.  
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